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Abstract
We study the dynamics of an industry subject to aggregate demand shocks where the produc-
tivity of a ﬁrm’s technology evolves stochastically over time. Each period, each ﬁrm, given the
aggregate demand shock, the productivity of its technology, and the distribution of technology
productivities in the economy, (i) chooses whether to remain in the industry or to exit to sell its
resources to an entrant; and (ii) an active ﬁrm chooses how much capital and labor to employ,
and hence output to produce. To characterize the intertemporal evolution of the distribution of
ﬁrms, we discuss in particular how exit decisions, aggregate output, proﬁts and distributions of ﬁrm
productivities vary, (a) across diﬀerent demand realization paths; (b) along a demand history path,
detailing the eﬀects of continued good or bad market conditions; and (c) for diﬀerent anticipated
future market conditions. Suﬃcient conditions are provide for worse demand realizations to lead
to increased exit of low-productivity ﬁrms and then to improved distributions of ﬁrms at all future
dates and states. Finally, it is shown that a downturn in demand can raise welfare due to the
impact on exit decisions.
Keywords: stochastic heterogeneity, aggregate shocks, exit, thin markets, demand uncertainty.
JEL: E32, L161 Introduction.
This paper integrates aggregate demand uncertainty into a dynamic stochastic model of ﬁrm entry and
exit, and derives the consequences both for the evolution of the distribution of ﬁrms and for individual
ﬁrm decision making. Our model builds on the dynamic stochastic equilibrium model of ﬁrm entry and
exit developed by Hopenhayn (1990, 1992a, 1992b). In these papers, Hopenhayn analytically characterizes
the individual exit and production decisions of ﬁrms according to their age, size and productivity in the
unique invariant steady state equilibrium.
We extend these analyses to an environment with aggregate demand uncertainty. We contrast individ-
ual ﬁrm investment and exit decisions and their consequences for aggregateoutput, proﬁts and productivity
distributions, (a) across diﬀerent demand realization paths; (b) along a demand history path, examining
the eﬀects of continued good or bad market conditions for future distributions of ﬁrms; and (c) for diﬀer-
ent anticipated future market conditions. We provide conditions under which the theoretical model can
reconcile empirical regularities regarding counter-cyclical exit, correlations of exit rates with future GDP
growth, and the relative length and extent of recessions and expansions.
Incorporating aggregate uncertainty together with individual stochastic heterogeneity — both nec-
essary features of a rich model of industry dynamics — introduces formidable technical and modeling
challenges. A signiﬁcant contribution of this paper is to characterize the distribution of ﬁrms, rather
than simply calculate selected higher order moments. In particular, we characterize the evolution of the
distribution of ﬁrms following arbitrary histories of demand shocks. To do this, we derive conditions under
which the distribution of ﬁrms can be ordered conditional on equilibrium exit decisions. In this context,
we consider such key questions as: Does an economy with a better distribution of ﬁrms produce more
output in all states? Will a more protracted period of high demand shocks lead to a better or worse
distribution of ﬁrms?
A second contribution is to endogenize the value of exit. We do so, by building in an opportunity cost
to exit: A ﬁrm can exit and sell its resources to another ﬁrm, but this requires that the ﬁrm’s resources
go un-utilized for a period while the resources are retooled so that they can be used by a potentially
more-eﬃcient entrant. The amount that an entrant is willing to pay for those resources reﬂects the proﬁts
that it expects to earn, and hence will vary with market conditions.
Endogenizing the value of exit complicates the characterization of the equilibrium evolution of the
distribution of ﬁrms. We prove that the endogenous value of production and the endogenous value of
exit vary procyclically, both rising with higher aggregate demand shocks. Two basic issues must then be
addressed: (i) Does ﬁrm exit rise or fall with higher demand shocks?, and (ii) Is the immediate impact
of these exit decisions on the distribution of ﬁrm productivities preserved over time? In particular, is the
eﬀect of reduced exit on the distribution of ﬁrms persistent, so that the distributions of ﬁrms is worse
at all subsequent dates and states, or could this eﬀect be reversed? Answering this second question is
fundamental to addressing the impact of recessions on the long-run productivity of the economy.
Obtaining analytical answers to these questions is diﬃcult. The standard analytical tool for this class
of models is to prove that the competitive economy corresponds to the solution of a social planner’s prob-
1lem. Here, even when the solution to a social planner’s problem characterizes equilibrium, it is of limited
help: The fact that the equilibrium solves a surplus maximization problem, does not a priori ensure that
an improvement in the distribution of ﬁrms adversely aﬀects all ﬁrms because of the endogenous eﬀects on
exit. Consequently, the social planner characterization is not useful in investigation issues such as whether
an improvement in the distribution of ﬁrms is preserved at all future dates and states.
This leads to the development of conditions on the transition process for a ﬁrm’s technology for the
aggregate distribution to be totally ordered. We consider environments where distributions can always be
ordered in stochastic dominance terms, and use this to prove that an improvement in the distribution of
ﬁrms is preserved along every future demand path. This yields a strong characterization result: Ceteris
paribus, an economy which had greater past exit produces more output at every future date and state.
When aggregate distributions are comparable in stochastic dominance terms one can identify condi-
tions under which exit rate are counter-cyclical. For standard production technologies (e.g., CES), the
endogenous value of production varies more with market conditions than the endogenous value of exit, for
any two-state Markov demand process. It follows that exit falls with higher demand. Combining this with
the result that the eﬀect of increased exit on future distributions of ﬁrm productivities is always preserved,
yields the result that demand downturns increase future output and lead to better future distributions of
ﬁrm productivities (ordered by stochastic dominance) at every future date and state.
We use these results to characterize how aggregate demand shocks aﬀect industry dynamics. We
examine how outcomes across diﬀerent demand realization paths, contrasting investment and exit decisions
and their consequences for aggregate output, proﬁts and productivity distributions when one history of
demand realizations is uniformly better than another. Following this, the consequences for outcomes
along a demand history path are studied in order to describe the eﬀect of continued good or bad market
conditions on both ﬁrm investment and exit decisions, and on aggregate variables. In particular, it turns
out that as a demand contraction continues, the distribution of ﬁrms grows ever better, setting the stage
for greater future output once demand improves. Conversely, ﬁrms in booming economies ‘rest on their
laurels’, so that the distribution of ﬁrms grows ever worse as a boom continues, sowing the seeds for a
greater fall in output when the demand boom ends.
We then derive the consequences of an improvement in anticipated future market conditions on current
and interim ﬁrm decisions and for the aggregate economy. We show that better anticipated future market
conditions induce more exit and give rise to better distributions of ﬁrm productivities at all earlier dates.
Relating our predictions to the data, we ﬁnd that the theoretical model generates the counter-cyclical
exit found in the data (Davis and Haltiwanger 1992), the correlations of exit rates with future GDP
growth that are positive, economically large, persistent and statistically signiﬁcant (Campbell 1998), and
the observation that recessions are shorter and sharper than expansions.
Finally, the paper considers how thin resale markets for an exiting ﬁrm’s specialized resources aﬀect
equilibrium dynamics. Thin resale markets are economically important. Ramey and Shapiro (2001) ﬁnd
that “The process of selling capital results in signiﬁcant declines in economic value (equipment sold for only
one-third its inﬂation-adjusted book value, after accounting for normal annual depreciation).... Because
2of the large discounts experienced on the sale of capital, the option value of installed capital is very high”.
Hence, “Firms may rationally hold on to (under-utilized) capital for long periods of time.” Thin markets
drive a wedge between the social and private opportunity cost of the resources. A bad ﬁrm recognizing
that it may not receive the full value of its resources, may continue to operate, tying up valuable assets
that would only be released upon exit.
Thinner resale markets reduce the sensitivity of the endogenous value of exit to current market con-
ditions. Importantly, we show that industries with more specialized inputs (thinner resale markets) will
have more unproductive, but larger, ﬁrms and lower rates of entry and exit. This can explain the ﬁnding
of Dunne et al. (1989a) that substantial and persistent diﬀerences in entry and exit rates across industries
exist, and that industries with higher entry rates also have higher exit rates. We show constructively
that a downturn in demand can actually enhance total welfare because it narrows the wedge between the
social and private opportunity cost of the plant, increasing exit. Thus, the Darwinian cleansing eﬀect of a
downturn on exit can raise future expected welfare by more than the immediate reduction in welfare due
to the downturn.
Finally, we highlight what this paper does not do. First, to focus on the impact of aggregate demand
shocks, our model does not directly introduce productivity gains from adopting new and better methods
of production (except to detail how incorporating such features into our model can generate predictions
consistent with the empirical regularity that recessions are sharper and more asymmetric than booms).
Levinsohn and Petrin (1999) ﬁnd that the factors we model dominate. They empirically decompose aggre-
gate industry productivity changes in Chile into the portion due to rationalization, i.e., the replacement
of losers by winners that we model; and the portion due to the adoption over time of better methods of
production. They ﬁnd “that very little of the increase in productivity was accounted for by ﬁrms actually
becoming more productive. Rather than ﬁrms becoming more productive, reallocation of market shares
to ﬁrms that were already more productive and net entry typically explain the increase in aggregate pro-
ductivity.” Indeed, our model predicts that newer ﬁrms should tend to be smaller, less eﬃcient and more
likely to exit — precisely the features found in the data — and features that are hard to reconcile with
environments in which dynamics are driven by entrants acquiring cutting edge technologies. Second, to
focus on the dynamics of the output market, we take input prices as constant as in Hopenhayn (1992a),
and allow ﬁrms to enter only through the acquisition of another ﬁrm’s plant. We highlight when and how
our qualitative ﬁndings extend if these assumptions are relaxed.
The outline of the paper is as follows. We next place our contribution in the literature. Section 2
describes the economic environment. Section 3 characterizes industry dynamics. Section 4 considers how
the resale market depth aﬀects outcomes. Section 5 concludes. Most proofs are in an appendix.
1.1 Related Literature.
Hopenhayn (1990, 1992a, 1992b) is most closely related to our work. Hopenhayn (1992a) characterizes
the individual patterns of entry and exit in the invariant steady state of his economy, emphasizing the
importance of (stochastic) heterogeneity across ﬁrms in explaining empirical regularities regarding the
3individual actions of ﬁrms. Dunne et al. (1989a, b) document that on an annual basis entering and exiting
ﬁrms account for about 40 percent of manufacturing ﬁrms, are on average one-third the size of continuing
ﬁrms, that exiting ﬁrms have higher costs and that the conditional probability of exit declines with both
age and size. The degree of heterogeneity across ﬁrms is enormous: Davis et al. (1996) document that
rates of job creation and destruction average about 10 percent a year, but are highly concentrated — only
23 percent of job destruction is accounted for by establishments that shrink by less than 20 percent over
a span of one year. These ﬁndings highlight the importance of ﬁrm speciﬁc sources of uncertainty for ﬁrm
survival and investment dynamics.
Jovanovic (1982) explores entry and exit dynamics when where ﬁrms learn about their proﬁtability
from past performance. In Jovanovic’s model, the economy improves systematically over time, as better
ﬁrms tend to be more successful, and hence remain in the industry, and there is no exit in the limiting
economy. Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994b) explore the entry and exit dynamics of an industry following
a theoretical innovation. Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994a) analyze a related environment in which there
is no entry or exit, but ﬁrms choose how much to invest to try to acquire a superior technology.
Because of the analytical challenges involved much of the literature relies on numerical characteriza-
tions. Ishwaran (2000) numerically investigates a version of Hopenhayn’s model in which demand evolves
according to a two-state Markov process and there is a single input, capital. She calculates moments
conditioned on ﬁrm age and demand state. Our analysis highlights the importance of the path-dependent
evolution of the economy. The entire history of demand shocks determines the equilibrium distribution of
ﬁrms, and this distribution, in turn, impacts exit decisions. Her paper highlights the fact that the proper-
ties of industry dynamics that we derive cannot be addressed numerically (e.g., when does increased past
exit or reduced demand lead to greater output at every future date and state?)
Campbell (1998) numerically analyzes a general equilibrium model of industry dynamics, melding a
version of Hopenhayn’s (1992a,b) model with a vintage capital model that embodies aggregate uncertainty
through innovations to the mean technology quality of new entrants. Campbell oﬀers a complementary
explanation to ours for the correlation between current exit and future GDP growth. He ﬁnds that greater
future anticipated technical innovations lead to more ﬁrm exit in earlier periods because consumers respond
by increasing savings and reducing current consumption.
Other papers turn to deterministic models. Caballero and Hammour (1994) simulate a model in which
demand follows an exogonously-speciﬁed cyclical path, new entrants are more productive, and there is
a ﬁxed cost of entry that depends exogenously on the measure of entrants. With suﬃcient entry cost
externalities, when demand falls, the exit of old, unproductive ﬁrms rises by more than the entry of new
productive ﬁrms falls, in which case average technology quality rises. Caballero and Hammour (1996)
consider a variant with costly search.
Other papers assume that all prices are constant, which simpliﬁes the analysis greatly, as the distri-
bution of ﬁrms in the economy does not aﬀect an individual ﬁrm’s proﬁts, and hence decision-making. In
such settings, Monge (2001) and Cooley and Quadrini (2001) explore the impact of interest rate shocks
on the entry and exit of ﬁrms and aggregate output. In their models, ﬁrms borrow to ﬁnance capital, and
ﬁrm productivities evolve stochastically. Cooley and Quadrini showing that their model is consistent with
4the empirical regularities that smaller/newer ﬁrms have higher and more variable growth rates because
they are credit rationed, yet they are more likely to exit.
Bergin and Bernhardt (2005) adopt the constant-price assumption to derive how dynamics are aﬀected
by the time-to-build feature of capital investment. Incorporating this feature of capital allows us to dis-
tinguish between large ﬁrms and productive ﬁrms, and to explain distinctly the size, productivity and age
patterns of proﬁt, output and exit. Capital in place “slows” exit responses by ﬁrms: Firms ﬁrst tend to
downsize and then exit in response to low demand or productivity shocks. As a result, the distribution of
ﬁrm productivities evolves more “sluggishly” in response to demand changes. Relatedly, Lambson (1991)
highlights how sunk costs dampen the responsiveness of entry and exit to market conditions.
Finally, Ericson and Pakes (1995, 1998) develop a parsimonious model of the industry dynamics of a
small, imperfectly competitive industry in which ﬁrms’ investments have stochastic outcomes. In their
reduced form model, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt depends on the relative success of its investment decisions. Their goal
is to develop a ﬂexible framework for empirical work, one that incorporates ﬁrm heterogeneity.
2 The Model.
We consider the dynamics of a single industry with a continuum of risk neutral ﬁrms that discount future
period proﬁts using a common discount factor, β ∈ (0,1). Inverse demand in a period is given by p(Y,θ),
where Y is industry output and θ is a random demand shock. This market price is a continuous function,
declining in Y and increasing in θ, with p(0,θ) > 0 and p( ,θ) ≥ 0. The demand shock follows a Markov
process: Given θ, the demand shock in the next period is drawn according to Θ(  | θ). We assume that
Θ(  | θ) is continuous in θ.1
A ﬁrm requires a plant to produce output according to the production function f(ℓ,α,k), where k ≥ 0 is
capital, ℓ ≥ is labor, and α captures the quality or productivity of its technology. The production function,
f(ℓ,α,k) is strictly monotone increasing in its arguments, strictly concave in k and ℓ with complementary
inputs, and with f(ℓ,α,k) = 0 if either ℓ or k is 0. Without loss of generality, we normalize α to be in
[0,1]. Let   be the distribution over technologies, α, in the economy.
Timing of events: At the beginning of a period, the aggregate shock, θ, determines demand, p(Y,θ), and
an operating ﬁrm with technology α receives a new realization of its technology, ˜ α, drawn from a distribu-
tion P(  | α) that is continuous in α. Given θ, and   each ﬁrm α decides whether to remain in the market
and produce that period, or exit to search for a buyer. The time-line for decisions is:
− − − − − → θ, α
realized













− − − − − →
˜ θ, ˜ α
realized
− − − − − →
Exit: We assume that plants are in ﬁxed supply, and without loss of generality we normalize the measure
1Throughout, we use the weak∗ topology on measures, so that for any continuous function h : Θ → R,
R
h(˜ θ)Θ(d˜ θ |
θn) →
R
h(˜ θ)Θ(d˜ θ | θ), as θn → θ.
5of plants in the economy and, hence the measure of possible ﬁrms, to one. Because plants are in ﬁxed
supply, new, potentially more productive, entrants must purchase a plant from an exiting ﬁrm.2 We
assume that the opportunity cost to continued production is that a ﬁrm cannot sell its plant immediately
to a potentially more eﬃcient user. That is, an exiting ﬁrm’s plant must be idled for the one period that
it takes to ﬁnd a buyer that can better employ plant and for the purchaser to re-tool the plant for its own
use.3 To capture a potentially thin market for an exiting ﬁrm’s plant, we assume that in negotiations with
the buyer, an exiting ﬁrm receives only a share 1 − γ ∈ (0,1] of the discounted proﬁts that a new entrant
expects given current market conditions when the entrant makes production and exit decisions optimally.
These assumptions capture the empirical ﬁndings of Ramey and Shapiro (2001), that “there (is) a time
cost to restructuring. The process of winding down operations before selling capital results in signiﬁcant
periods of under-utilization. It is only at times when ﬁrms cease operations that they sell signiﬁcant
portions of capital.” They also ﬁnd that a ﬁrm which sells its capital generally receives far less than the
capital’s value, especially for more specialized capital. The value of γ captures the degree to which the
plant is highly specialized so that exiting ﬁrm less than its full value from the ﬁrm that buys it.4
The ﬁndings are reinforced if it takes a new user longer to retool, so that upon exit a plant must
remain idle for more than one period. Also, if there is positive probability that an exiting ﬁrm does not
ﬁnd a buyer in the period following exit, then the qualitative impacts are (a) to reduce the sensitivity of
the value of exit to current market conditions, and (b) to sever the tight link between the mass of exiting
ﬁrms in the previous period and the mass of entrants.5
Entry: Entry is determined by the exit in the previous period, and that, in turn depends on market
conditions. What complicates the analysis is that not only does the value of a plant varies with market
conditions, but so too do the respective values of producing and exiting. When demand is higher, the
foregone cost of production is higher, but persistence in demand implies that the value of a more productive
future technology is also higher, so that a prospective buyer is willing to pay more. We derive conditions
under which weaker demand leads to more exit.
Firm decisions: If ﬁrm type α stays in the market, it chooses capital and labor to maximize proﬁt,
max
ℓ,k
pf(ℓ,k,α) − wℓ − rk,
where p is the market-clearing equilibrium price, w > 0 is the wage rate and r > 0 is the unit price of
capital. Later, in remark 2, we highlight conditions under which our analysis extends when factor prices
vary with the aggregate shock, θ. The solution to this proﬁt maximization problem gives input demands,
ℓ(p,α) and k(p,α), and supply function y(p,α) = f(ℓ(p,α),k(p,α),α).
2After our analysis, we discuss how allowing for entry by creation of new ﬁrms in addition to entry by acquisition aﬀects
the results. Dunne et al. (1989a,b), and Baldwin and Gorecki (1987) document the importance of entry through purchase
of existing ﬁrms. Baldwin (1995) ﬁnds that “Acquisition entry is (as) important a force in changing the composition of an
industry as greenﬁeld entry.”, and that acquired plants exhibit increased productivity and acquire greater market shares.
3We could alternatively assume that ﬁrms can continue to operate while searching for a buyer, but that they received a
reduced proﬁt relative to what they would receive were they not searching.
4One can endogenize γ by assuming that a random number of potential users of an exiting ﬁrm’s plant compete in a
second-price sealed bid auction. If there is only one bidder in a period, it makes an oﬀer that leaves the exiting ﬁrm indiﬀerent
between accepting the oﬀer and waiting a period in the hope of attracting more bidders.
5In the current model, plants may be idle for multiple periods, if an exiting ﬁrm is replaced by a new ﬁrm that decides
to exit after observing its draw of α and the random demand shock, θ.
6Market Clearing: With measure   on technologies, given an exit rule α∗ (all ﬁrms with technologies less







y(p,α) (dα) = Y (p, α∗).
Price is determined by θ and  α∗ via the market-clearing condition Y (p, α
∗
) = D(p,θ), where D(p,θ) is
the inverse of p(Q,θ) for each θ. With price p(θ, α∗) determined by (θ, α∗), a ﬁrm α earns proﬁt
π(θ, α∗,α) = max
ℓ,k
p(θ, α∗)f(ℓ,k,α) − wℓ − rk.
Evolution of Technologies: If a ﬁrm’s current technology is α, then next period’s technology is drawn from
P(  | α), a conditional distribution over technologies given α. To capture the fact that a ﬁrm with a better
technology in one period is likely to have a better technology the next period, we assume that
P(  | α) = w(α)F( ) + [1 − w(α)]G( ),
where F  c G (F conditionally stochastically dominates G), F  = G, w(α) ∈ [0,1] is continuous and
strictly increasing in α.6 That is, the new technology of a ﬁrm with current productivity parameter α is
drawn from a weighted distribution of a good distribution, F( ), and a bad distribution G( ), where the
weight, w(α), on the good distribution is an increasing function of the ﬁrm’s current productivity. For
simplicity, we assume that the technology quality of a new ﬁrm is drawn from the distribution P(  | ¯ α),
where ¯ α ∈ (0,1) is suﬃciently large that the worst ﬁrm type always chooses to exit. As a result, in
equilibrium, ﬁrms with technology below some exit threshold, α∗ < ¯ α, exit; and those above α∗ remain
in the market.
The weighted-average transition kernel ensures that technology distributions are ordered by a single
parameter and avoids diﬃculties that exit can create for comparing distributions over time. To see the
issue, suppose that technology distribution   stochastically dominates  ′ due to the fact that  ′ has
many very bad technologies. Then, when the same exit rule is applied to both, the resulting distribution
determined by  ′ may dominate the distribution determined by  , thereby reversing the ordering of
distributions. For example, this would occur if   puts all mass between α∗ and ¯ α, (α∗ < ¯ α) so that no
ﬁrms exit; while  ′ puts all mass below α∗, so that every ﬁrm exits and receives a technology drawn from
P(  | ¯ α), which is better than a draw from any distribution P(  | α), for α < ¯ α.
The only other structure that we impose is that there is some learning by doing in the evolution of a
ﬁrm’s technology:7
Z
P( ,α)P(dα, ¯ α)   P( , ¯ α).
That is, ﬁrms tend to improve over time: The technology of a ﬁrm in its second period of operation is
drawn from a stochastically better distribution than the initial distribution governing the technology of
entering ﬁrms.
6Given two probability distributions F and G on [0,1], say that F conditionally ﬁrst order stochastically dominates G
(F  c G) if given α∗, for α ≥ α∗ : F(α | α ≥ α∗) ≤ G(α | α ≥ α∗). That is, given any α∗, the conditional distribution on
[α∗,1] determined by F ﬁrst order dominates that of G.
7For the results we use a far weaker condition,
R
w(˜ α)dF(˜ α) ≥ w(¯ α), which is implied by
R
P( ,α)P(dα, ¯ α)   P( , ¯ α).
72.1 Equilibrium Exit
We next turn to characterizing equilibrium exit decisions. We ﬁrst describe how the productivity of
a ﬁrm’s future technology is related (stochastically) to its current technology, and then detail how the
productivity of an entering ﬁrm is determined. We then characterize valuation functions and the optimal
exit decision of an individual ﬁrm.
In the study of the dynamics, two distributions are of special interest: The residial distribution of
operating ﬁrms at time t after exit decisions have been made, and the distribution of ﬁrms in the next
period induced by exit decisions. Recall that  α∗ denotes the measure obtained from   after all ﬁrms with
technologies that are less productive than α∗ exit:  α∗(X) =  (X ∩ [α∗,1]). An exit rule α∗ combined






P(  | ¯ α) (dα) +
Z
[α∗,1]
P(  | α) (dα).
Exit over time: In equilibrium, a ﬁrm’s exit decision maximizes expected proﬁts given (αt, t,θt), and the
distribution of ﬁrms over time is consistent with the optimization by almost all ﬁrms, for almost all θt. At
any date t, equilibrium is characterized by an exit threshold that depends on   and θ, α( ,θ). This fully
determines the evolution of the aggregate distribution   over time along any path of demand realizations,
(θ1,θ2,...). Consequently, the exit rule determines the market-clearing price sequence facing ﬁrms, and
hence the present value of any ﬁrm α. The exit rule, α( ,θ), is an equilibrium exit rule if and only if it
determines a valuation function, v, that supports the exit rule: It must be that at ( ,θ) ﬁrms wish to exit
if and only if their technology is below α( ,θ). Let α∗ = α(θ, ). Then, the expected value to a ﬁrm α
from operating in the current period (and acting optimally thereafter) is:




, ˜ α)Θ(d˜ θ | θ)P(d˜ α | α),
and the expected value to exit is




, ˜ α)Θ(d˜ θ | θ)P(d˜ α | ¯ α).
Here “vc” denotes the value of continuing to operate, and “ve” denotes the value of exiting. The value
of an operating ﬁrm α facing market conditions (θ, ) is equal to the sum of its maximized operating
proﬁts plus the discounted expected value of continuing to operate given that it chooses inputs optimally
and makes future operation-exit decisions optimally. The expression for vc reﬂects the potentially thin
resale market for an exiting ﬁrm’s plant: An exiting ﬁrm only receives fraction 1−γ of the full discounted
expected value of the plant to a new ﬁrm whose technology quality is drawn according to ¯ α. Since ﬁrms
choose optimally whether to exit or to continue in operation, the value of a ﬁrm α is given by
v(θ, ,α) = max{v
c(θ, ,α),v
e(θ, ,α)}.
Since ve is independent of α, while vc is increasing in α, there is a unique value, ˆ α, at which vc and ve
are equal. Firms with technologies above ˆ α wish to continue and ﬁrms with technologies below ˆ α wish to
8exit. A necessary condition for equilibrium is that α∗ = ˆ α: The exit rule α(θ, ) must satisfy
vc(θ, ,α(θ, )) = ve(θ, ,α(θ, )),∀(θ, ).
Clearly, α(θ, ) < ¯ α, because of the opportunity cost of exiting and transfering the plant to the en-
trant. In summary, for each ( ,θ) an equilibrium exit rule is characterized by α∗ = α∗( ,θ) where
vc(θ, ,α∗) = ve(θ, ,α∗): Firms with α > α∗( ,θ) remain in the market, while ﬁrms with α < α∗( ,θ)
exit. That is, it the less productive/higher cost ﬁrms that ﬁnd it optimal to exit so that their plant can
be reallocated to better uses. This result is consistent with Dunne et al.’s (1989b) ﬁnding that higher cost
plants exit ﬁrst, and Baldwin’s (1995) ﬁnding that entrants, while relatively unproductive compared to
the average ﬁrm, are more productive than the exiting ﬁrms that they replace.
Bergin and Bernhardt (1995) provide suﬃcient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in
economies with a continuum of agents, aggregate shocks and idiosyncratic shocks to agent types, in
which an agent’s payoﬀ depends on his own type and action, the aggregate shock and the distribution
over agent types and actions in the economy. The mild continuity assumptions on the transition functions
and payoﬀs that are required for an equilibrium to exist are satisﬁed here.
3 Dynamics.
Our goal is to characterize how demand ﬂuctuations aﬀect future distributions of ﬁrm productivities and
proﬁts, as well as aggregatevariables such as prices and industry output. We ﬁrst investigate the possibility
of characterizing dynamics in the competitive economy using a social planner’s characterization. We then
use a more direct approach to characterize equilibrium dynamics.
3.1 Social Planner’s Characterizations.
The standard approach to characterizing industry dynamics is to show ﬁrst that the competitive equi-
librium corresponds to the solution of a social planner’s problem, and then to solve that social planner’s
problem (e.g., see Hopenhayn (1992a)). We now detail when the competitive equilibrium to our econ-
omy can be characterized as the solution to a social planner’s problem. We then explain why this social
planner’s characterization is of limited help in facilitating an analysis of industry dynamics.
If γ = 0 (thick resale markets for plants), then exit decisions in the competitive equilibrium correspond
to the exit rule of a social planner who seeks to maximize discounted social surplus. Period social surplus
can be represented as the area between the demand and supply curves. Let Ps(Y, ′) denote the aggregate
supply curve when the distribution of ﬁrms in operation is  ′. Then if total output is Y ∗, social surplus
is S(Y ∗,θ, ′) =
R
[0,Y ∗][P(Y,θ) − Ps(Y, ′)]dY . The social planner program is the optimization of the
present value of the social surplus stream by choice of continuation (and hence exit) distribution. The
functional equation for the social planner’s problem is:






[P(Y,θ) − Ps(Y, α)]dY + β
Z
Θ
V (˜ θ, α)Θ(d˜ θ | θ)}.
9Here, Ps(Y, α) is the aggregate supply function, reﬂecting that the labor choices of operating ﬁrms
correspond to those made by the social planner. That is, if at price P, ﬁrm α supplies y(P,α), then total
output is Y (P, α) =
R
y(P, ˜ α) α(d˜ α). Inverting for P gives Ps(Q, α). The solution to this program
yields an exit rule, α(θ, ), at each (θ, ), which determines the evolution of the aggregate distribution.
Theorem 1 If γ = 0, then the exit rule in the competitive economy is unique and corresponds to the
solution to the social planner’s problem.
Proof: See the appendix.
The social planner characterization only holds when γ = 0. When γ > 0, the thin market for a ﬁrm’s
plant means that some of the value of the ﬁrm is extracted by the purchaser, reducing the incentive to exit
relative to the true market value of the ﬁrm. In such circumstanes, the level of exit is socially ineﬃcient,
less than the socially optimal level of exit, so that no social planner’s characterization holds.
Theorem 1 asserts that if γ = 0, then the exit rule in the competitive economy is unique and corresponds
to the solution to the social planner’s problem. However, the social planner’s approach is of limited help.
It does not a priori follow that an improvement in the distribution adversely aﬀects all ﬁrms because of
the endogenous eﬀects on exit. A change in the distribution from   to ˆ   also alters the equilibrium exit
threshold, and both determine next period’s distribution. In particular, there may be no ordered relation
between the one-period-ahead distributions arising in equilibrium from   and ˆ   respectively, so that it
may not be possible to determine which leads to higher proﬁt for a speciﬁc ﬁrm. That is, some ﬁrm types
may beneﬁt from an increase in   if the resulting impact on exit of other ﬁrms in some future states goes
the “wrong” way (e.g., if exit is greater in some future period where a ﬁrm type expected to be better).
3.2 Competition and Payoﬀ Monotonicity
Fluctuations in demand directly aﬀect exit decisions, and hence future distributions of ﬁrm productivities.
In turn, diﬀerences in the distribution of ﬁrm productivities inﬂuence future exit decisions. To analyze the
impact of demand ﬂuctuations, we consider the role played by diﬀerences in the distribution of ﬁrm produc-
tivities. We ﬁrst prove that (i) individual valuation functions are always monotone decreasing in   (a better
distribution of competitors always reduces the expected proﬁts of all ﬁrm types); and (ii) an important
dominance condition is satisﬁed: In equilibrium, better technology distributions are preserved over time,
so that if  t ≻ ˆ  t, then along any future common demand shock path, at any future date τ > t,  τ ≻ ˆ  τ.
In Theorem 2, we consider a ﬁnite horizon version of the economy. Let vc
n(θ, ,α) and ve
n(θ, ,α) be the
(equilibrium) values to ﬁrm α from continuing and exiting respectively, when the current distribution is  
and the current state is θ, and there are n periods remaining. When the horizon is ﬁnite, the equilibrium
exit rule can be computed by backward induction. Indeed theorem 2 proves that, independent of whether
the social planner formulation is applicable, the equilibrium exit rule is unique. That is, at each ( ,θ),
there is a unique equilibrium threshold. Further, vc
n and ve
n are monotone decreasing in  . If they converge
as n increases, monotonicity is preserved.
10Theorem 2 Payoﬀs are monotonically decreasing in the technology distribution and, in equilbrium, better
distributions on technologies are maintained over time. Formally:
1. The functions vc
n(θ, ,α) and ve
n(θ, ,α) are continuously decreasing in   for all n.
2. If ˆ  t    t, then ˆ  t+1    t+1.
Finally, if vc
n and ve
n converge pointwise as n → ∞, then the limiting functions are continuously decreas-
ing in  . When γ = 0, vc
n and ve
n converge since they are derived from a social planner program which
converges as n → ∞.
Proof: See the appendix.
The result that vc
n(θ, ,α) and ve
n(θ, ,α) are continuously decreasing in   is both subtle and impor-
tant. The key is to prove that comparing two aggregate distributions ˆ  t and  t at period t, if ˆ  t    t,
then ˆ  t+1    t+1 (so that result 1 follows from 2). To do this, we show that while exit may be less in the
economy with the better distribution, it cannot be so much less that it reverses the ordering in distribu-
tions. Thus, dominance is inherited in subsequent periods. Were the dominance property not preserved
over time, then some ﬁrm type may prefer to face a better distribution of competitors in t if that better
distribution implied a worse distribution in t + 1, when the ﬁrm type expected to have a higher α.
This result is far from immediate. Indeed, if capital choices are made before the demand and productiv-
ity shocks are realized, more structure is required to ensure this monotonicity result. This is because capital
and technology productivities have distinct eﬀects on exit decisions (see Bergin and Bernhardt (2005)).
The fact that a better distribution of technology productivities is preserved along every future demand
path is crucial for the analysis that follows. Theorem 3 exploits this directly, showing that along a common
demand path, in an otherwise identical economy with a better initial distribution of ﬁrms, future output
in every future demand state is greater. Consequently, prices are always lower in the economy with the
better initial distribution of ﬁrms, hurting all ﬁrms.
Theorem 3 Consider two period t distributions,  t and ˆ  t over ﬁrm technologies. Suppose that ˆ  t    t
implies that ˆ  t+1    t+1. Then along a common demand path, for τ ≥ t, output is higher in the hat
economy, ˆ Yτ > Yτ, so that prices and ﬁrm proﬁts are lower: ˆ pτ < pτ and ˆ π(α)τ < π(α)τ.
Proof: By assumption an improvement in the distribution at time t (  ↑  ′) improves next period’s
distribution (taking into account the resultant change in the current exit rule), and increases current
period’s output. Proceeding inductively, the improvement in next period’s distribution leads to an increase
in that period’s output and an improvement in the distribution for the following period. And so on. Thus,
the initial distribution in every period (prior to the exit decision) is better, and the output in every period
greater. The patterns for prices and proﬁts follow.
11Thus, improved competition raises current output with associated consequences for prices and prof-
itability. Improved competition may raise exit, but not by enough to oﬀset the output consequences of the
improved ﬁrm quality. Again, Bergin and Bernhardt (2005) show that more structure is required if ﬁrms
choose capital prior to demand and technology shock realizations. This is because ﬁrms respond to a worse
distribution over technologies by increasing capital, and capital and technology productivities have distinct
impacts on output and exit decisions. However, analogous results follow if demand is suﬃciently elastic.
3.3 Cyclical Fluctuations.
We have derived the impact of diﬀerent initial distributions of ﬁrms for productivity, output, price and
proﬁtability along a given demand path, {θτ−1}τ≥t. We next study the impact of ﬂuctuations in θ on exit
decisions, output, and proﬁtability of ﬁrms. This allows us to characterize the consequences of demand
shocks for current and future output, and current and future aggregate productivity. What complicates
the analysis is that when demand improves, there are competing inﬂuences on a ﬁrm’s decision to exit:
operating is more proﬁtable, but the ﬁrm is also worth more if sold. That is, improved demand raises
incentives to remain in the market which would reduce the average eﬃciency of ﬁrms in the market next
period. However, the persistence of improved demand also raises the beneﬁt to having a better technology
next period, producing a “counter-incentive” for ineﬃcient ﬁrms to exit.
3.3.1 Cyclical Exit
We ﬁrst derive conditions under which, ceteris paribus, downturns in demand induce more (unproductive)
ﬁrms to exit (worsening the immediate eﬀect of the downturn), to be replaced by ﬁrms that are stochasti-
cally better. We then combine this result with Theorem 2 to derive that worse current demand conditions
always imply better future distributions of ﬁrm technologies. That is, not only do recessions have the
cleansing eﬀect of weeding out more ﬁrms with unproductive technologies, but past recessions also reduce
the number of unproductive technologies at each future date and state. Exit decisions thus mitigate the
impact of a prolonged downturn in demand.
The equilibrium exit threshold, α∗, is determined by








, ˜ α)Θ(d˜ θ | θ)P(d˜ α | ¯ α).







, ˜ α)P(d˜ α | ˆ α), ∀ˆ α, and rearrange the expression to give:
π(θ, α∗,α∗) = β
Z 
[(1 − γ)¯ v(˜ θ, α
∗
, ¯ α) − ¯ v(˜ θ, α
∗
,α∗)]Θ(d˜ θ | θ).
With α∗ ﬁxed, raising the current demand shock raises current proﬁt, but if there is persistence in demand
shocks, raising the current shock also makes higher future shocks more likely, raising the relative future
payoﬀ from exit (and being replaced by a stochastically better technology). Whether α∗ rises with θ (i.e.,
whether there is less exit), then depends on which rises more.
12Inspection reveals that quite generally, the value of remaining in the industry rises more rapidly with
θ than does the value of exit as long as there is suﬃcient mean reversion in the demand process. In
particular, this is so if demand shocks are independently distributed.8 For a broad class of production
technologies, we now prove that there is always “enough” mean reversion in any two-state Markov demand
process for the relative value of remaining in the industry to rise with demand.
Speciﬁcally, we now focus attention on technologies that give rise to multiplicatively separable proﬁt
functions, so that π(α,p( ,θ)) = g(p)h(α) for some functions g and h. This class of production functions
includes such standard production technologies as the CES and quadratic production functions.
Consider θ ∈ {¯ θ,θ} with θ ≤ ¯ θ. Let ¯   and   be, respectively, the distributions of ﬁrm qualities induced
by an arbitrarily long sequence of θ = θ and θ = ¯ θ realizations starting from  ∞, the unique stationary
distribution when demand is independent of θ. The next theorem establishes that in this environment,
there is more exit if demand is low than if it is high.
Theorem 4 Let proﬁt functions be multiplicatively separable. Then for θ ∈ {θ, ¯ θ}, for any distribution of
ﬁrm technologies   ∈ [ , ¯  ], there is more exit if demand is low than if it is high: α( ,θ) > α( , ¯ θ).
Proof: See the appendix.
In the proof we show that the exit rule does not depend on the initial demand realization if demand is
perfectly persistent: the ‘demand’ shock enters current and continuation proﬁts in the same multiplicative
way. Persistence in demand does not aﬀect current proﬁts, but it does aﬀect future expected proﬁts.
When the current demand is low, reducing demand persistence raises the probability of a future high
demand shock and hence raises future expected prices. This raises the value of a better technology in
the future, and hence the attraction of exit. Conversely, reducing demand persistence when the current
demand shock is high, reduces future expected prices, reducing the value of a better future technology,
lowering the relative value of exit. Combining these observations reveals that there is more exit when
demand is low than when demand is high.
3.3.2 Output, price and proﬁt movement.
We next combine the implications of theorem 3 (better distributions are preserved along a demand path,
implying lower prices) and theorem 4 (exit is counter-cyclical) to characterize the evolution of key variables
as demand shocks persist for a longer period of time.










[(1 − γ)¯ v(˜ θ,µα∗
, ¯ α) − ¯ v(˜ θ,µα∗
,α∗)][Θ(d˜ θ | θ′) − Θ(d˜ θ | θ)].
However, this condition is diﬃcult to verify.
13Theorem 5 Let proﬁt functions be multiplicatively separable. Then for θ ∈ {θ, ¯ θ}, for  t−1 ∈ [ , ¯  ]:
1. Aggregate output is higher in period t if demand is high than if it is low: Yt(¯ θ, ) > Yt(θ, ),∀ .
2. If a period of high demand begins in period t and ends τ+1 periods later then aggregate output ﬁrst rises
and then falls, Yt−1 < Yt > Yt+1 >     > Yt+τ+1, so that prices rise throughout: pt < pt+1 <     < pt+τ.
Hence, the output and proﬁts of a ﬁrm of type α rise: yt−1(α) < yt(α) <     < yt+τ(α) and πt−1(α) <
πt(α) <     < πt+τ(α).
3. If a low demand downturn begins in period t and ends τ + 1 periods later, then Yt−1 > Yt < Yt+1 <
    < Yt+τ+1 so that prices fall as the downturn continues: pt−1 > pt >     > pt+τ. Hence, the output
and proﬁts of a ﬁrm type α fall as the downturn continues: yt−1(α) > yt(α) >     > yt+τ(α) and
πt−1(α) > πt(α) >     > πt+τ(α).
Proof: Part 1 follows because there is less exit when θ = ¯ θ. Part 2 follows because the distribution
worsens over time as the boom progresses (see the proof to theorem 4), implying that output falls (theorem
3). The implication of falling output for prices, ﬁrm output and proﬁts is immediate. Part 3 is the downturn
analogue to part 2.
A more prolonged period of high demand leads to an increasingly ineﬃcient distribution of ﬁrms, which,
in turn, implies rising prices and hence higher individual output and proﬁts. It is worth stressing that
this result holds no matter how persistent the demand shock process is. With two demand states, {¯ θ,θ},
in a demand boom, if viewed as a growth in demand occurs over one time period, output rises during
the growth stage (as in 2. above) and subsequently tails oﬀ due to the worsening distribution of ﬁrm
productivities as demand remains high.
Importantly, were we to modify the model to incorporate an exogenous systematic growth in tech-
nological opportunities, then the model can generate predictions consistent with the empirical regularity
that recessions are sharper and more asymmetric than booms. In particular, if, in periods of high de-
mand, the exogenous improvement in the distribution of technology productivities is enough to oﬀset the
increasingly ineﬃcient (endogenous) distribution of ﬁrm productivities, then output grows gradually as
long as demand remains high. Conversely, any systematic improvements in the distributions from which
technologies are drawn sharply reinforces the endogenous improvement in ﬁrm productivities caused by a
downturn in demand, so that recessions are short.
Also note that incorporating stickiness into capital investment, either with a capital-in-place formu-
lation or by modeling the putty-clay feature of capital, prolongs the industry response to downturns in
demand. Bergin and Bernhardt (2005) show that ﬁrms respond to a decrease in demand by ﬁrst down-
sizing, and then subsequently exiting. Consequently, output may fall for multiple periods following the
onset of a period of low demand.
Combining the insights of theorems 3 and 5, it follows immediately that past downturns lead to greater
output, once demand has ‘recovered’. Consider two economies that diﬀer only in that one economy had
14a past period in which demand was lower in previous periods. Say that demand has ‘recovered’ in the
economy that had lower shocks if both economies have the same current demand shock. Then:
Corollary 1 Consider two economies with identical current demand, but one economy had weakly lower
demand shocks in past periods. Then the economy which has ‘recovered’ from a past history of lower
demand has a better distribution of ﬁrms, greater output and lower prices.
Qualitatively, given theorem 3, the key to the corollary is that there is more exit in bad times. That
is, as long as exit rates are counter-cyclical — θ < θ
′
then α( ,θ) > α( ,θ
′
) — (as Campbell (1998)
documents empirically), then the result holds without further structure on the θ process.
We have shown that exit is counter-cyclical in a two-state separable environment. So, too, (without
imposing any other structure) exit will also be counter-cyclical as long as demand is not too persistent. As
long as exit is counter-cyclical, we can contrast industry dynamics across economies that start out with
the same distribution of ﬁrms, but one receives higher aggregate demand shocks than the other:
Theorem 6 Suppose that the suﬃcient conditions hold for exit to be counter-cyclical. Let ˆ  0 = ¯  0.
Consider two aggregate shock histories, ˆ θt, ¯ θt where the hat economy has higher demand realizations than
the bar economy: ˆ θ0 > ¯ θ0, ˆ θτ ≥ ¯ θτ,0 ≤ τ ≤ t. Then past lower demand:
1. Leads to better distributions of ﬁrms: ¯  τ+1 ≻ ˆ  τ+1, 0 ≤ τ ≤ t.
2. Raises future output, thereby reducing future prices and ﬁrm proﬁts: ¯ Yτ > ˆ Yτ, ¯ pτ < ˆ pτ, and ¯ πτ(α) <
ˆ πτ(α), 0 ≤ τ ≤ t.
Proof: Result 1 follows immediately from counter-cyclical exit and theorem 2. Consider the ﬁrst period
τ in which ˆ θτ > ¯ θτ. Then, counter cyclical exit ensures the higher demand shock implies less exit, and
hence a worse distribution of ﬁrms. From theorem 2, even if subsequent demand shocks are identical, the
worse distribution is preserved; and subsequent higher demand shocks reinforce the result.
Result 2 follows since the distribution of ﬁrms on the “bar” path is better than the distribution on the
“hat” path, price will be lower on the “bar” path unless there is (substantially) more exit in the “bar”
economy. So suppose that ¯ αt > ˆ αt. But then,
π(ˆ θt, ˆ  
ˆ αt
t , ˆ αt) < π(ˆ θt, ˆ  
ˆ αt, ¯ αt) < π(¯ θt, ¯  
¯ αt















t+1(˜ θ, ˆ  ˆ αt+1, ˜ α)Θ(d˜ θ | ˆ θ)[(1 − γ)P(d˜ α | ¯ α) − P(d˜ α | ˆ αt+1)],
a contradiction. The implications for output and ﬁrm proﬁts are immediate.
Here, for example, ¯  τ is the distribution on technology along the ¯ θ sequence. Weak demand has the
immediate eﬀect of inducing more ineﬃcient ﬁrms to exit, which leads to an improved distribution of ﬁrm
15eﬃciencies, which persists at all future dates (1). The higher productivity caused by a past downturn
implies greater future output once demand ‘recovers’ suﬃciently (2), illustrating the cleansing eﬀect of
recessions for future output. Indeed, if there is suﬃciently little persistence in demand, then a lower
current demand shock must raise expected future discounted total surplus. In turn, this increased future
competition implies lower future prices and hence lower proﬁts for a ﬁrm of a given technology quality.
The greater the stress of a demand downturn (i.e., the lower are the demand realizations and the longer
the lower demand realizations persist), the more ﬁt are the survivors, and hence the more productive is the
entire industry. These results are consistent with the ﬁndings in the empirical literature that correlations
of exit rates with future GDP growth are positive, large, persistent and statistically signiﬁcant (Campbell
(1998)).
Our theorems state the results in terms of the impact of a more prolonged boom in demand. The
results can also be stated in terms of their converse — more prolonged recessions lead to greater output
when demand ﬁnally improves, and more sustained high demand leads to steeper declines to lower levels
of output when demand ﬁnally falls.
Remark 1: The focus of our model is on a speciﬁc industry: we take factor prices as given. However, it is
worthwhile to consider the extent to which our results remain valid were factor prices to vary with market
conditions. Firm α’s period production problem becomes, maxℓ,k p( ,θ)f(ℓ,k,α)−w( ,θ)ℓ−r( ,θ)k. This
determines ﬁrm α’s proﬁt, π(θ, ,α). So, as when factor prices are constant, α’s proﬁt depends on the same
three variables. The feature that our analysis exploits is ∂π
∂θ > 0: better times raise period proﬁts for all ﬁrm
types. This is unequivocal if θ aﬀects only demand. More generally, an application of the envelope theorem







∂θ k > 0,∀α. A suﬃcient condition for this to
be so is that technologies be Cobb Douglas or quadratic, so that the proﬁt function is a multiplicatively sep-
arable function of the ﬁrm’s productivity parameter: if an increase in θ helps one ﬁrm type, it helps all ﬁrm
types, and with a Cobb-Douglas technology, f(k,ℓ) = kbℓc, it does so if
p
wcrb rises with θ. Our theorems all
extend to general equilibrium if, in addition, (a) factor prices (weakly) increase with industry input demand
(so reduced past exit further raises period proﬁts), and (b) re-interpreting the demand shocks as industry
period proﬁt shocks (that take into account the equilibrium impacts on factor prices), there is persistence
in the θ ‘proﬁt’ shocks. Theorem 2 extends because worse distributions of ﬁrms, ceteris paribus imply
lower factor prices. In turn, persistence in ‘proﬁt’ shocks, plus counter cyclical exit, ensure that the other
theorems extend, including a generalized version of theorems 4 and 5 (given counter cyclical exit holds).
Remark 2: Although modeling entry is not a focus of this paper, here the number of new entrants
corresponds to the measure of ﬁrms in their ﬁrst period of production. Entry is greater when the economy
leaves a recession (as is found in the data), both because there are more exiting ﬁrms due to the past
downturn and because the increase in demand implies that more ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to produce.
One can augment the model to allow for entry “by birth”, so that a potential entrant can enter the
market by creating a new ﬁrm rather than taking over an existing one. Both forms of entry are important.
In Canadian manufacturing, Baldwin and Gorecki found that entrants after 1970 accounted for 26.2%
of total sales by 1979. Those that entered by creating a ﬁrm accounted for 14% of total sales, while
16those that entered by acquiring another ﬁrm accounted for over 12% of total sales. Modifying our model
to accommodate entry through the creation of new ﬁrms would appear to reinforce the counter-cyclical
movement in the distribution of ﬁrm quality. With demand persistence, a high demand shock should
increase the expected payoﬀ of an entrant, and hence raise entry. Because, on average, ﬁrm productivities
rise with age, the immediate impact of additional entry would be to lower the average eﬃciency of ﬁrms
in operation, reinforcing our results. An associated implication is that contemporaneous entry and exit
will tend to be negatively correlated, as is observed in the data.
3.4 Dynamics and Expectations.
We next consider the impact of an anticipated future increase in demand on current exit decisions and
hence future distributions of ﬁrm productivities. We show that, ceteris paribus, better anticipated future
market conditions leads to more exit at all earlier dates. Fix a future point in time, T, and consider
the impact of replacing the transition kernel Θ(θT | θT−1) with one of the alternative transition kernels,
¯ Θ(θT | θT−1) or ˆ Θ(θT | θT−1). If ¯ Θ(θT | θT−1) ≻ ˆ Θ(θT | θT−1) for each θT−1, then from the perspective of
time t < T, ¯ Θ(θT | θT−1) represents the expectation of better demand that ˆ Θ(θT | θT−1) — an anticipated
increase in future demand relative to ˆ Θ.
Theorem 7 Consider two economies that diﬀer solely in anticipated future demand conditions at date T:
¯ Θ(θT | θT−1) ≻ ˆ Θ(θT | θT−1), ∀ θT−1.
(For t  = T, the two economies agree with transition kernel Θ(θt | θt−1).) Then for any given demand
shock θt−1, and distribution  t−1, an anticipated increase in future demand at date T gives rise to a better
distribution of ﬁrm productivities at all intermediate dates: ¯  τ ≻ ˆ  τ,∀τ ∈ {t,...T}.
Proof: Because the period T distribution of demand shocks is better in the bar economy,
Z Z
¯ vT(˜ θT, , ˜ α)¯ Θ(d˜ θT | θT−1)P(d˜ α | α) >
Z Z
ˆ vT(˜ θT, , ˜ α)ˆ Θ(d˜ θT | θT−1)P(d˜ α | α).
Thereafter, demand realizations are drawn from the same distribution, so ¯ vT( ) = ˆ vT( ). For any given
 T−1, current proﬁts for any marginal exiter π(θT−1, T−1α∗,α∗) are the same in both the hat and bar
economies, but the value to exit is greater in the bar economy. Hence, for any given  T−1, there must
be more exit in the bar economy than the hat economy, so that ¯  T( T−1) ≻ ˆ  T( T−1). In turn, this
increased exit in the bar economy implies that for any given  T−1 and θT−1, date T −1 prices are higher
in the bar economy than the hat economy. In turn, this implies that
Z Z
¯ vT−1(˜ θT−1, , ˜ α)Θ(d˜ θT−1 | θT−2)P(d˜ α | α) >
Z Z
ˆ vT−1(˜ θT−1, , ˜ α)Θ(d˜ θT−1 | θT−2)P(d˜ α | α).
Hence, for any given  T−2, there is more exit in the bar economy than the hat economy, so that ¯  T−1 ≻
ˆ  T−1. Monotonicity of  T in  T−1 then implies that ¯  T(¯  T−1( T−2),θ) ≻ ¯  T(ˆ  T−1( T−2),θ).
Repeating the argument, observe that since for any given  T−2 there is more exit in the bar than hat
economy, the distribution of prices must be higher in the bar than hat economy at date T −2, so that date
17T −2 continuation payoﬀs must be greater for any given  T−2 in the bar economy than the hat economy.
Hence, for any given  T−3, there must be more exit in the bar economy than the hat economy. Repeating
this argument, it follows that ¯  t ≻ ˆ  t,0 < t ≤ T.
The key to Theorem 7 is that an anticipated improvement in future demand does not directly aﬀect
current proﬁts; it only raises the future value of having a better technology, and hence the value of
exit. If the anticipated improvement in demand is only one period ahead, then the future value of being
productive is increased, raising current exit and lowering current output, thereby indirectly raising current
prices and proﬁts. When the anticipated demand increase is further in the future, its anticipation raises
the distribution of productivities at all earlier dates in the stochastic dominance sense. This is because
to increase future productivity, exit must be raised, increasing the distribution of prices prior to the
productivity improvement. In particular, suppose to the contrary that exit ﬁrst increased at the last date
prior to the improvement in demand, T − 1. But this increased exit reduces period T − 1 output, raising
period T − 1 prices and hence the value of exit at date T − 2. Thus, anticipation of increased future
exit in advance of the demand increase, drives exit and productivity increases at earlier dates. Hence,
anticipation of diﬀerent future market conditions can generate the positive correlations of exit rates with
future GDP growth found by Campbell (1998).
4 Thin Resale Markets.
So far we have not considered how industry dynamics vary across industries distinguished by diﬀerent
depths of the market for the plants of exiting ﬁrms. That is, we have not considered how variations in γ
aﬀect outcomes. The degree of plant specialization varies signiﬁcantly across industries. We now provide
conditions under which the smaller is γ, i.e., the thicker is the market for the plant of an exiting ﬁrm, the
greater is exit. Finally, we show by construction that when γ > 0 so that the social and private incentives
to exit do not coincide, then not only can a recession weed out ‘bad’ ﬁrms, but a downturn in demand
can actually raise welfare (total surplus) by inducing more eﬃcient exit.
The direct eﬀect of a thinner market is to reduce exit. To see this suppose there is a one-time increase
in thinness in the market for a bankrupt ﬁrm’s plant, so that γ increases to γ′, an increase that is un-
anticipated at earlier dates. This increase to γ′ reduces the value of exit relative to the value of remaining
in the industry, leading to a worse distribution of ﬁrms at all future dates.
The net eﬀect of a thinner resale market is more subtle because of the indirect eﬀect of reduced exit
on future competition. If γ < γ′, it does not follow that for all (θ, ,α), that vγ(θ, ,α) > vγ′(θ, ,α).
While suﬃciently unproductive ﬁrms are worse oﬀ facing γ′, because bankrupt ﬁrms sell their plants for
less, the indirect consequence of reduced exit is that the future distribution of ﬁrms is worse. In turn, this
reduced future competition implies higher future prices, so that high α ﬁrms that are unlikely to enter
bankruptcy may be helped if ﬁrms are more reluctant to exit. Consequently, for γ < γ′, it may not be
that vc
γ(θ, ,α) − ve
γ(θ, ,α) > vc
γ′(θ, ,α) − ve
γ′(θ, ,α), for all (θ, ). It must be true for some (θ, ),
18else the future distribution of ﬁrms would always be better in the γ′ economy, so that both the direct and
indirect eﬀects would encourage more exit in the γ′ economy, a contradiction of the premise.
If there is no aggregate uncertainty, so that p(Y,θ) = p(Y ), then we can derive the eﬀects of an increase
in γ on industry dynamics:
Theorem 8 Suppose there is no aggregate uncertainty, so that p(Y,θ) = p(Y ). Then for all γ, given  0,
there is a unique equilibrium. The distributions of ﬁrm productivities converge monotonically over time
to the unique stationary equilibrium: either  
γ
t    
γ
t−1,∀t or  
γ
t−1    
γ
t ,∀t. In the limiting stationary
economies, for γ > γ′,









2. The limiting distribution is better in the economy with the thicker resale market,  γ
′
∞ ≻  γ
∞.
3. Any given α operates at a larger and more proﬁtable scale in the economy with thinner markets.
The characterization of the evolution of the distribution of ﬁrms to the invariant steady state extends
Hopenhayn (1992a) who analyzes the behavior of individual ﬁrms in the limiting economy. In particular,
this theorem shows that the economy does not cycle over time as it approaches the limiting steady state.
If γ is interpreted as reﬂecting the degree to which inputs are specialized in an industry, then inter-
industry comparisons can be made. Industries with more specialized inputs will tend to have more
unproductive, but larger, ﬁrms and lower rates of exit. This is consistent with the ﬁnding of Dunne et al.
(1989a) and Asplund and Nocke (2003) that substantial and persistent diﬀerences in entry and exit rates
across industries exist, and that industries with higher entry rates also have higher exit rates.9
Further insights on the eﬀects of thin markets for a bankrupt ﬁrm’s plant can be gleaned from the
polar case of perfectly elastic demand, p(Y,θ) = p(θ). The qualitative ﬁndings hold as long as demand is
‘suﬃciently’ elastic. If p(Y,θ) = p(θ), then vγ(θ, ,α) = vγ(θ, ˆ  ,α), ∀ , ˆ  : only the direct negative eﬀect
of γ on exit remains. When p(Y,θ) = p(θ), the marginal exiting ﬁrm equates
π(θ,α∗(θ)) = β
Z
vγ(˜ θ, ˜ α)Θ(d˜ θ|θ)[(1 − γ)P(d˜ α|¯ α) − P(d˜ α|α∗)].
Since the right-hand side is decreasing in γ, it follows immediately that a reduction in γ raises exit,
and hence the distribution of ﬁrm technology qualities. Individual ﬁrms exit according to their private
incentives, 1−γ, so there is too little exit from a total surplus maximization perspective. The exit decision
corresponds to the exit choice made by a social planner when the exiting ﬁrm is destroyed with probability
γ; the fact that next period’s distribution of ﬁrms does not reﬂect this destruction is irrelevant because the
distribution does not aﬀect a ﬁrm’s payoﬀs. The greater is γ, the greater is the wedge between equilibrium
exit and eﬃcient exit.
We now show constructively that when γ > 0, so that ﬁrms are too reluctant from a surplus-maximizing
standpoint to exit, downturns in demand can increase welfare by inducing ineﬃcient ﬁrms to sell their
9Asplund and Nocke (2003) oﬀer a sunk cost explanation for this empirical regularity.
19plants to ﬁrms that could use them more productively. Because downturns in demand raise the attraction
of exit, they induce more ineﬃcient ﬁrms to act in accordance with maximizing social surplus, so that
privately optimal actions are more closely aligned with socially optimal actions.
Example: Let technologies be given by αf(ℓ), where α ∈ {α, ˆ α},α < ˆ α. Suppose that the productivity
of a ﬁrm’s technology does not vary with time, αt = αt−1, and that entrants are equally likely to draw
each technology: Pr(α = ˆ α|entry) = .5. Demand is perfectly elastic: p(Y,θ) = θ,θ ∈ {θ, ¯ θ},θ < ¯ θ, and
demand shocks are independently and identically distributed. Markets for a bankrupt ﬁrm’s plant are
thin: 1 > γ > 0. The discount factor is β > .5. There are as many good ﬁrms as bad.
Suppose that α is suﬃciently small relative to ˆ α that total surplus is maximized when α ﬁrms exit.
Let γ be such that ﬁrm type α is just indiﬀerent between continuing to operate and exiting. Such a γ
exists because the value of exiting varies continuously with γ from 0 when γ = 1 to the expected value of
the new entrant when γ = 0. Consider the consequence for total surplus of a one-time marginal reduction
in θ. This drop in demand induces all unproductive, α, ﬁrms to exit. The marginal loss in proﬁts to a
good ﬁrm from this reduced consumer demand is ˆ αf(ℓ∗(ˆ α,θ)). The marginal loss in expected discounted
proﬁts to a bad ﬁrm is zero, since it now exits and previously was indiﬀerent between exiting and not. If
we let z =
βE[π(θ,α)]
(1−β) , then the value of exit is
(1−γ)z
(1−γβ). The social gain from inducing exit of ineﬃcient α
ﬁrms is therefore
γ(1−β)z
(1−βγ) . Since there are just as many good ﬁrms as bad ﬁrms, the one-time reduction
in θ from θ increases social surplus if and only if
γ(1−β)z
(1−βγ) > ˆ αf(ℓ∗(ˆ α,θ)). But note that ˆ αf(ℓ∗(ˆ α,θ)) does
not depend on ¯ θ. Let γ(¯ θ) be the value of γ that leaves α just indiﬀerent to exit when θ = θ:
dγ
dθ > 0. As
¯ θ is increased, it must be the case that
γ(1−β)z
(1−βγ) eventually exceeds ˆ αf(ℓ∗(ˆ α,θ)), so the one-time recession
of a lower θ increases total surplus.
If γ is suﬃciently large, bad ﬁrms fail to internalize the social cost of their failure to exit and thereby have
their technologies replaced by stochastically better ones. Downturns cause more bad ﬁrms to internalize
these social costs and exit. If this gain from increased exit outweighs the foregone period surplus from
lower consumer demand then total surplus is raised.
5 Conclusion.
This paper explores the dynamics of an industry when there is both aggregate demand uncertainty and
idiosyncratic uncertainty about the productivity of an individual ﬁrm’s technology. We characterize the
intertemporal evolution of the distribution of ﬁrms, where ﬁrms are distinguished by the productivity of
their technology. We contrast industry dynamics across diﬀerent demand shock histories, along a particular
demand shock history, and detail how anticipation of future demand shocks aﬀects exit decisions and the
industry’s evolution. Our theoretical predictions about cyclical patterns in exit and productivity oﬀer a
coherent explanation for the cyclical patterns exhibited in the data.
206 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: Fix the distribution   on [0,1] and let  (dα) = g(α)dα. If ﬁrms with technology
lower than α exit then let  α denote the truncated distribution. If the price is P the supply of ﬁrm α is
q(P,α) and total supply is Ys(P, α) =
R 1
α q(P,α) (dα). We can invert this to get Ps(Y, α). Since the
exit threshold uniquely deﬁnes the distribution  α, we may write α in place of  α, with corresponding
supply and inverse supply functions: Ys(P,α) and Ps(Y,α).
The current period social surplus is given by S(θ,Y,α) =
R Y
0 [P(Q,θ)−Ps(Q,α)]dQ. Maximizing this












































































Now, let V satisfy the recursion:






[P(Q,θ) − Ps(Q,α)]dQ + δ
Z
Θ
V (˜ θ, α)Θ(d˜ θ | θ)}
where  α( ) =
R 1
α P(  | α) (dα)+
R α
0 P(  | ¯ α) (dα) and  (dα) = g(α)dα. Let v(α, α) be the continuation





















[P(Q,θ) − Ps(Q,α)]dQ + δ
Z
Θ
V (˜ θ, α)Θ(d˜ θ | θ)
o











v(˜ θ, ˆ α, α)P(dˆ α | ¯ α)g(α)Θ(d˜ θ | θ)






v(˜ θ, ˆ α, α
∗





v(˜ θ, ˆ α, α)P(dˆ α | ¯ α)Θ(d˜ θ | θ)]g(α∗)
So, the exit threshold that maximizes the social surplus, is the technology threshold at which a ﬁrm is
indiﬀerent between exiting and remaining in the market.
Remark: The calculations below conﬁrm that the diﬀerential condition used above is satisﬁed recursively.
Put  (γ)( )
def =  γ( ) =
R 1
γ P(  | α) (dα) +
R γ
0 P(  | ¯ α) (dα) where  (dα) = g(α)dα. Then
 (γ)α( ) =
Z 1
α
P(  | α) (γ)(dα) +
Z α
0
P(  | ¯ α) (γ)(dα).
Collecting terms:
 (γ)α( )[= ( γ)α] =
Z 1
α
P(  | ˆ α)
Z 1
γ
P(dˆ α | α) (dα) +
Z 1
α
P(  | ˆ α)
Z γ
0




P(  | ¯ α)
Z 1
γ
P(dˆ α | α) (dα) +
Z α
0
P(  | ¯ α)
Z γ
0
P(dˆ α | ¯ α) (dα).
Rearranging:





















P(  | ¯ α)P(dˆ α | ¯ α)g(α)dα.
Or






P(  | ˆ α)P(dˆ α | α) +
Z α
0







P(  | ˆ α)P(dˆ α | ¯ α) +
Z α
0











v(˜ θ, ˜ α, (γ)α){
Z 1
α
P(d˜ α | ˆ α)P(dˆ α | γ) +
Z α
0
P(d˜ α | ¯ α)P(dˆ α | γ)}g(γ)
i






v(˜ θ, ˜ α, (γ)α){
Z 1
α
P(d˜ α | ˆ α)P(dˆ α | ¯ α) +
Z α
0
P(d˜ α | ¯ α)P(dˆ α | ¯ α)}g(γ)
i












v(˜ θ, ˜ α, (γ)





v(˜ θ, ˜ α, (γ)
α)P(d˜ α | ¯ α)P(dˆ α | γ)}g(γ)
i













v(θ, ˜ α, (γ)α)P(d˜ α | ¯ α)P(dˆ α | ¯ α)}g(γ)
i
Θ(˜ θ | θ).






















P(dˆ α | α)g(α)dα +
Z γ
0
P(dˆ α | ¯ α)g(α)dα)]dP.







q(P, ˆ α)P(dˆ α | γ)g(γ) +
Z 1
α



















π(θ, (γ), ˆ α)P(dˆ α | γ)g(γ) +
Z 1
α




π(θ, (γ), ˆ α)P(dˆ α | γ) +
Z 1
α








π(θ, (γ), ˆ α)P(dˆ α | γ) +
Z 1
α










v(˜ θ, ˜ α, (γ)





v(˜ θ, ˜ α, (γ)
α)P(d˜ α | ¯ α)P(dˆ α | γ)}g(γ)
i















v(˜ θ, ˜ α, (γ)α)P(d˜ α | ¯ α)P(dˆ α | ¯ α)}g(γ)
i
Θ(˜ θ | θ).
23Rearranging positive and negative terms, this yields:
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∂γ


































v(˜ θ, ˜ α, (γ)











v(˜ θ, ˆ α, (γ))Θ(d˜ θ | θ)P(dˆ α | ¯ α)g(γ).
Thus, the derivative of the valuation function preserves the diﬀerence of valuation between a new ﬁrm
and a continuing ﬁrm.
The discussion in theorem 2 below utilises properties of the class of distributions generated by the trun-
cation procedures used in the paper. The following lemma establishing that with the weighted-average
kernel transition, either increasing the measure of exiting ﬁrms, i.e., increasing the exit threshold α∗ for
a ﬁxed distribution  , or improving the current distribution over ﬁrm technologies   for a ﬁxed exit rule
α, leads to an improved distribution of ﬁrm technology qualities in the next period. This result is used
subsequently in the proof of theorem 2.
Lemma 1 The measure  α
∗
( ) satisﬁes:
1. Raising the exit threshold improves next period’s distribution:
ˆ α∗ ≥ α∗ implies  ˆ α
∗
( ) ≻  α
∗
( ).
2. For a given exit threshold, an improvement in the current distribution improves next period’s distri-
bution:
ˆ  ,  ∈ W(F,G) = {  | ∃β ∈ [0,1],  = βF + (1 − β)G}, ˆ   ≻   implies ˆ  α
∗
( ) ≻  α
∗
( ).
Proof : We ﬁrst show that for   = βF + (1 − β)G,  ′ = β′F + (1 − β′)G, with β′ > β. Then F   G
implies  ′    . To see this, it is suﬃcient to show that φβ(α) is increasing in β for each α ≥ α∗, where:





φβ(α) =  ([α,1] | α ≥ α∗) =
βF([α,1]) + (1 − β)G([α,1])
βF([α∗,1]) + (1 − β)G([α∗,1])
24=
β[F([α,1]) − G([α,1])] + G([α,1])













[βk(α∗) + d(α∗)]2 .
The numerator is
F([α,1])G([α∗,1]) − G([α,1])G([α∗,1]) − [F([α∗,1])G([α,1]) − G([α∗,1])G([α,1])].





















> 0 from conditional ﬁrst order stochastic dominance,  ′    .






P(  | ¯ α) (dα) +
Z
[α∗,1]




w(α) (dα) + G( )
Z
[α∗,1]
(1 − w(α)) (dα)








(1 − w(α)) (dα) +  ([0,α
∗))(1 − w(¯ α))]G( ).
Let
xα∗(α) = χ[0,α∗)(α)w(¯ α) + χ[α∗,1](α)w(α),
so that E {xα∗} =
R





( ) = E {xα∗}F( ) + [1 − E {xα∗}]G( ).
To prove 1, note that α∗ < ¯ α, and since w is monotone increasing, the function xα∗ is constant and equal
to w(¯ α) on [0,α∗), has a “downward jump” at α∗ (from w(¯ α) to w(α∗)), and is monotone increasing on
[α∗,1]. If ¯ α ≥ ˆ α∗ ≥ α∗, then xˆ α∗ ≥ xα∗, so that
E {xˆ α∗} ≥ E {xα∗}.
Thus 1 holds. Now we prove 2.
25Let   = βF( ) + (1 − β)G( ). We need to show that as β increases, E (xα∗) increases. Note that
E (xα∗) =  ([0,α
∗))w(¯ α) +  ([α





w(α) (dα) = β
Z
[α∗,1]




βF([α∗,1])EF{w(α) | α ≥ α∗} + (1 − β)G([α∗,1])EG{w(α) | α ≥ α∗}.
Thus,
E {xα∗} = [βF([0,α
∗)) + (1 − β)G([0,α
∗))]w(¯ α)+
βF([α
∗,1])EF{w(α) | α ≥ α
∗} + (1 − β)G([α
∗,1])EG{w(α) | α ≥ α
∗},
or
E {xα∗} = β[F([0,α∗))w(¯ α) + F([α∗,1])EF{xα∗ | α ≥ α∗}]+
(1 − β)[G([0,α∗))w(¯ α) + G([α∗,1])EG{xα∗ | α ≥ α∗}].
Using stochastic dominance (xα∗ is increasing on [α∗,1]),
EF{xα∗ | α ≥ α∗} ≥ EG{xα∗ | α ≥ α∗}.
Provided EF{xα∗ | α ≥ α∗} ≥ w(¯ α), E {xα∗} is increasing in β. A suﬃcient condition for this to be so is
that EF{w} ≥ w(¯ α). But
R




w(α)P(dα, ¯ α)]F( ) + [1 −
Z











w(α)P(dα, ¯ α)]F( ) + [1 −
Z
w(α)P(dα, ¯ α)]G( ),
so that
R
w(α)F(dα) = EF{w} ≥ w(¯ α).
Proof of Theorem 2: We prove the result inductively. Let vc
n(θ, ,α) be the payoﬀ (present value) to
agent α in an n-period problem, when the current aggregate shock is θ, the current aggregate distribution
is   and the agent chooses to stay in the market with n periods remaining. Similarly, ve
n(θ, ,α) is the
payoﬀ to agent α when the current aggregate shock is θ, the current aggregate distribution is   and
the agent chooses to exit the market with n periods remaining. The maximum of these functions is:
vn(θ, ,α) = max{vc
n(θ, ,α),ve
n(θ, ,α)}.
At n = 1, they are deﬁned: vc
1(θ, ,α) = π(θ, ,α) and ve
1(θ, ,α) = 0. From the properties of the
proﬁt function, these are continuously decreasing in  . Now, assume that the result holds for n − 1:
26both vc
n−1(θ, ,α) and ve
n−1(θ, ,α) are continuous and decreasing in  . This implies that v∗
n−1(θ, ,α) is
decreasing in  .
Consider the variation   ↑ ˆ  . The impact eﬀect of this (with no change in the exit rule) is to lower
both current proﬁt and future expected proﬁt:















vn−1(˜ θ, αn(θ), ˜ α)Θ(d˜ θ | θ)[(1 − γ)P(d˜ α | ¯ α) − P(d˜ α | αn(θ))] =
Z
˜ θ˜ α
There are two cases to consider: (1) π′ <
R ′
˜ θ˜ α and (2) π′ >
R ′
˜ θ˜ α.
Case (1): π′ <
R ′
˜ θ˜ α
In case (1), to restore equilibrium we require that π′ ↑ and
R ′
˜ θ˜ α ↓. To raise π′, raise αn(θ) (say ˆ αn(θ)
is the exit value that restores equilibrium: continuity of period proﬁts in the exit rule, αn(θ), follows
because output and hence price are, so that there exists such an ˆ αn(θ)). This increase in exit increases
the eﬃciency of ˆ  αn(θ)) as the distribution moves to ˆ  ˆ αn(θ)). As a result
R ′
˜ θ˜ α falls, and this is reinforced
by the “fall” in [(1−γ)P(d˜ α | ¯ α)−P(d˜ α | αn(θ))] as αn(θ) ↑ ˆ αn(θ). These changes result in a continuous
fall in
R ′
˜ θ˜ α to
Rˆ








vn−1(˜ θ, ˆ  ˆ αn(θ), ˜ α)Θ(d˜ θ | θ)[(1 − γ)P(d˜ α | ¯ α) − P(d˜ α | ˆ αn(θ))]
and from the calculations,
Rˆ
˜ θ˜ α <
R ′
˜ θ˜ α ≤
R
˜ θ˜ α. Write ˆ π = π(θ, ˆ  ˆ αn(θ), ˆ αn(θ)) for the new equilibrium current
proﬁt. Now,









= π(θ, αn(θ),αn(θ)) = π
current proﬁt has fallen. Since ˆ αn(θ) > αn(θ),
π(θ, ˆ  ˆ αn(θ),αn(θ)) < π(θ, ˆ  ˆ αn(θ), ˆ αn(θ)) < π(θ, αn(θ),αn(θ)).
Thus,
∀α, π(θ, ˆ  ˆ αn(θ),α) < π(θ, αn(θ),α).
Therefore, price is lower and output higher. Also, because ˆ  ˆ αn(θ) ≻ ˆ  αn(θ) ≻  αn(θ) and vn−1 is monotonic
in  , Z
˜ θ
vn−1(˜ θ, ˆ  ˆ αn(θ), ˜ α)Θ(d˜ θ | θ) <
Z
˜ θ
vn−1(˜ θ, αn(θ), ˜ α)Θ(d˜ θ | θ)
Consequently, vc
n(θ, ˆ  ,α) < vc
n(θ, ,α). Similarly, ve
n(θ, ˆ  ,α) < ve
n(θ, ,α). Since both π′ and
R ′
˜ θ˜ α are
continuous in   and αn(θ), so are vc
n(θ, ,α) and ve
n(θ, ,α).
27Case (2): π′ >
R ′
˜ θ˜ α
In this case, we want to reduce π′ and raise
R ′
˜ θ˜ α. As π(θ, ˆ  αn(θ),αn(θ)) is too high, reduce αn(θ) to
ˆ αn(θ) (say, the new equilibrium exit rule) where ˆ  ˆ αn(θ) ≻  αn(θ). This reduces current proﬁt further,
with greater output and lower price. As αn(θ) declines, this reduces the eﬃciency of ˆ  αn(θ), so that
R
˜ θ vn−1(˜ θ, ˆ  αn(θ), ˜ α)P(d˜ θ | θ) increases. In addition [(1 − γ)P(d˜ α | ¯ α) − P(d˜ α | αn(θ))] increases. At the
new solution:






vn−1(˜ θ, ˆ  ˆ αn(θ), ˜ α)Q(d˜ θ | θ)[(1 − γ)P(d˜ α | ¯ α) − P(d˜ α | ˆ αn(θ))]
Since














vn−1(˜ θ, ˆ  ˆ αn(θ), ˜ α)Q(d˜ θ | θ)[(1 − γ)P(d˜ α | ¯ α) − P(d˜ α | ˆ αn(θ))].
And, since
[(1 − γ)P(d˜ α | ¯ α) − P(d˜ α | ˆ αn(θ))]   [(1 − γ)P(d˜ α | ¯ α) − P(d˜ α | αn(θ))]












vn−1(˜ θ, ˆ  
ˆ αn(θ), ˜ α)Θ(d˜ θ | θ)
Were it the case that  αn(θ) ≻ ˆ  ˆ αn(θ), this could hold for no α. Thus, this cannot be the case, and since
the set of measures is totally ordered (from the weighted average assumption), the reverse is true:













vn−1(˜ θ, ˆ  
ˆ αn(θ), ˜ α)θ(d˜ θ | θ)∀˜ α
This implies that for all α, vc
n(θ, ˆ  ,α) < vc
n(θ, ,α). Similarly, for all α, ve
n(θ, ˆ  ,α) < ve
n(θ, ,α).
Continuity again follows immediately. Note that in both cases, ˆ  ˆ αn(θ) ≻  αn(θ).
Proof of Theorem 4: Let Pr(θ = ¯ θ|¯ θ) = ρ; Pr(θ = θ|θ) = φ. Suppose that ρ = φ = 1, so that for








, ˜ α)[(1 − γ)P(d˜ α | ¯ α) − P(d˜ α | α
∗)].
With ρ = φ = 1 the state is constant over time and equal to θ. It is straightforward (see Bergin and
Bernhardt (2005), Theorem 4) to show that the aggregate distribution converges (monotonically) to some
28distribution  ∞(θ): limt→∞ t →  ∞(θ), with associated price sequence, p( t,θ) → p( ∞,θ). From the
multiplicative decomposition of proﬁts, asymptotically, the value functions are multiplicative functions
of price, so that the exit rule, α∗, is asymptotically independent of θ (and only relative prices matter).
Hence,  ∞(θ) =  ∞(¯ θ) =  ∞ with associated exit rule α∞.
Let αρφ(θ, ) be the equilibrium exit threshold at state θ when the aggregate distribution is   and the
transition probabilities on θ given by ρ and φ. Note that α1φ(¯ θ, ∞) = α∞ = αρ1(θ, ∞) because at ρ = 1
(φ = 1) the exit rule at (¯ θ, ∞) ((θ, ∞)) is independent of φ (ρ).
For any (θ, ), observe that αρφ(θ, ) is (a) increasing in ρ and (b) decreasing in φ. (Raising ρ raises
the future payoﬀ leaving current payoﬀ unchanged and therefore leads to more exit, increasing φ reduces
the future payoﬀ leaving current payoﬀ unchanged and therefore leads to less exit.) Thus,
α1φ(θ, ∞) > αρφ(θ, ∞) > αρ1(θ, ∞) = α∞ = α1φ(¯ θ, ∞) > αρφ(¯ θ, ∞) > αρ1(¯ θ, ∞).
Next, ﬁx some ρ,φ pair. Since αρφ(θ, ∞) > α∞ > αρφ(¯ θ, ∞), at the distribution  ∞, more exit
occurs at θ than at ¯ θ. Starting at  ∞, denote the next period’s distribution following ¯ θ by  
¯ θ
1 and
following θ by  
θ
1. Noting that  ∞ =  ∞
∞,  
¯ θ
1 ≺  ∞ ≺  
θ
1.
To make dependence on  ∞ explicit, write  
¯ θ
1( ∞) ≺  ∞ ≺  
θ
1( ∞). Since for ﬁxed θ, improving
(worsening) the current distribution improves (worsens) next period’s distribution, if the aggregate shock
at  
¯ θ
1( ∞) is ¯ θ, then next period’s distribution  
¯ θ,¯ θ
2 ( ∞) ≺  
¯ θ
1( ∞). Letting ¯ θ(t) denote t realizations
of ¯ θ, and  
¯ θ(t)
t ( ∞) the associated distribution in t periods, the distribution satisﬁes:  
¯ θ(t+1)
t+1 ( ∞) ≺
 
¯ θ(t)
t ( ∞). Let   denote the limit. Similar reasoning gives  
θ(t+1)
t+1 ( ∞) ≻  
θ(t)
t ( ∞), where  
θ(t)
t ( ∞) is
the distribution t periods later following a history of t-θ shocks. let ¯   denote the limit.
Now, ﬁx some   ∈ ( , ∞). Given ¯ θ, let  
¯ θ( ) be next period’s distribution. From the previous
reasoning,  
¯ θ( ) ≺  . Next, consider   and the shock θ. In this case,  θ( ) ≻  . To see this, note that
as φ increases, the future payoﬀ is lower and this reduces exit. However, at θ with φ = 1, the system
stays in state θ and the aggregate distribution increases to  ∞ asymptotically. In particular,  θ( ) ≻  
when φ = 1. However, when φ < 1 the future payoﬀ increases and this increases exit (recall αρφ(θ, ) is
decreasing in φ so exit increases as φ falls). But more exit improves next period’s distribution, so that for
the given φρ pair,  θ( ) ≻  . Thus,  θ( ) ≻   ≻  
¯ θ( ). This implies that exit at (θ, ) is greater than
exit at (¯ θ, ), or αρφ(θ, ) > αρφ(¯ θ, ). This completes the argument.
Proof of Theorem 8: Fix γ. We ﬁrst argue that because distributions can be ordered over time, so
that either we are in the stationary economy, or that  
γ
t ≻  
γ
t−1,∀t, or that  
γ
t−1 ≻  
γ
t ,∀t. Suppose
to the contrary that  
γ
t ≻  
γ
t−1, but that  
γ
t    
γ




t (if   ≻  ′ the same




































t , ˜ α)[(1 − γ)P(d˜ α | ¯ α) − P(d˜ α | α
∗γ
t )].
But this implies that for some α, vγ( 
γ
t ,α) > vγ( 
γ
t+1,α), but  
γ
t    
γ
t+1, a contradiction. An analogous
contradiction is derived if we assume that  
γ
t−1 ≻  
γ
t , but  
γ
t+1    
γ
t .




∞: The limiting economy is stationary.
We now argue that there is a unique equilibrium path. Suppose the equilibrium path is not unique.
There are two cases to consider — where the distributions move in opposite directions and where they
move in the same direction. Suppose that there were at least two equilibrium paths, indexed by hat and








0 . Dropping the γ index, the argument above implies that
ˆ pt > ˙ pt, ∀t ≥ 1. Further, since ˆ α∗
0 < ˙ α∗
0, ˆ p0 < ˙ p0. But then,
π0( 0 ˆ α∗
0, ˆ α
∗














One can derive a similar contradiction to the possibility of two equilibrium paths, indexed by hat and








0    0, or the converse. Again, abusing notation,









ˆ v1 requires that there must be a future date where ˆ  t ≻ ˙  t. Since ˙  ∞ ≻ ˆ  ∞ there is a
greatest date T such that ˆ  T   ˙  T. But ˆ  (ˆ  T)   ˆ  (˙  T). Again,
˙  T+1 ≻ ˆ  (˙  T) → ˙ πT > ˆ πT →
Z
˙ vT+1(˙  T+1, ˜ α) >
Z
ˆ vT+1(ˆ  (˙  T, ˜ α),
a contradiction, since prices from T + 1 on must be higher in the hat economy.
Now consider γ > γ′, and suppose that at the stationary distribution of ﬁrms in the no prime economy,
 γ




∞), so that  γ






∞. But then vγ(α, γ































a contradiction. Hence,  γ
′




∞. In turn, pγ
′
∞ < pγ
∞ implies that any given α in the no
prime economy operate at a larger and more proﬁtable scale.
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